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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States plays an odd role in the international community. It is, 
simultaneously, its most involved and most reclusive member, seeking to 
maintain stability in a troubled world, yet remaining strangely apart from 
many of the legal institutions of that world. This odd role is exemplified by 
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the United States‘ failure to ratify key United Nations treaties1 or its doing so 
only after burdening the treaty with numerous reservations, understandings, 
and declarations (―RUDs‖).2 In all this, the United States frequently reflects 
what has been aptly called ―American Exceptionalism,‖3 a notion that, 
although somehow different from much of the world, the United States will 
nevertheless satisfy its international obligations without the bother of binding 
itself to international obligations. Thus, though an active participant in the 
drafting of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (―CEDAW‖), and despite having signed it in 1980, the 
United States has let the agreement languish in that legal limbo to which the 
United States has frequently consigned such matters. Indeed, much of the 
American narrative on international law is marred by a startling 
parochialism, often inconsistent with its international leadership aspirations.
4
 
But why is that? 
This Article will attempt to answer that question. Part II examines the 
remarkable venom that runs through much of the American narrative about 
CEDAW. It is odd that a United Nations convention would produce that 
reaction, but it is evident from the rants in the lowliest blogs to the statements 
made in the highest reaches of government. Part III develops the notion of 
American Exceptionalism more fully, as it helps to explain much of the 
 
 
 1. The United States has ratified neither the Convention of the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, nor the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS AT 1 APRIL 2009, 
Vol. I, pt. I at 286, 391, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009) [hereinafter 
MULTILATERAL TREATIES]. Moreover, it ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide almost forty years after signing it. Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer 
the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 166 (2006). Among signatory countries, aside from the United 
States, only Somalia has failed to ratify the Children‘s Convention, and only Iran, Somalia, and Sudan 
have failed to ratify CEDAW. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra, at 291. 
 2. CEDAW, like other Conventions, affords States Parties the opportunity to file such 
objections to various provisions of a Convention. However, article 28 prevents a State Party from 
filing one which is ―incompatible with the object and purpose‖ of the Convention. CEDAW art. 28(2), 
1249 U.N.T.S. 23. 
 3. See generally Judith Resnik, Law‟s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, 
and Federalism‟s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006); Risa E. Kaufman, Human 
Rights in the United States: Reclaiming the History and Ensuring the Future, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 149, 154 (2008) (book review). 
 4. For example, in 1994, John Bolton, later to become the U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations, said, ―The United States makes the UN work when it wants it to work, and that is exactly the 
way it should be, because the only question, the only question for the United States is what is in our 
national interest.‖ Indeed, later in that debate he famously said that were the United Nations 
headquarters to lose ten stories, ―it wouldn‘t make a bit of difference.‖ John Bolton, Address at the 
Global Structures Convocation (Feb. 3, 1994) (partial transcript available at http://www.democracy 
now.org/2005/3/31/john_bolton_in_his_own_words). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/2
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substantive content of that narrative. This part explores the sentiment 
justifying why CEDAW and those who implement it have been so deeply 
criticized: it is an international product, overseen and implemented by those 
from elsewhere.  
This merges into the main argument against ratification—that CEDAW 
encroaches impermissibly on American sovereignty. As the argument goes, it 
displaces domestic norms with external ones, thus depriving Americans of 
decision-making authority over the content of their laws. But that is wrong 
structurally and substantively. By adopting those norms, they become 
domestic; indeed, no divide exists between ―American‖ norms and ―outside‖ 
norms, as laws migrate as surely as people do.
5
 Thus, Part IV will address 
two requirements that need to be met before the United States can ratify 
CEDAW. First, it must accept a federalist construct in which dialogue takes 
place among the different forms of government: federal, state, and local. 
Doing so will necessitate an acknowledgement that no norms will be 
imposed on anyone, for this is not a hierarchical process. 
Second, the United States must create the institutions that further that 
dialogue. Many models exist, and the United States must adopt an 
appropriate one. This Article will review some choices that other countries 
have made. More importantly, though, it will insist that scholars and policy-
makers re-cast this dialogue, recognizing the inaptness of a persistent 
American Exceptionalism in the current world, but not deriding those for 
whom it has virtue. 
II. CEDAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
On July 17, 1980, the Carter administration signed CEDAW. Addressing 
the Senate several months later, President Carter noted that though it 
presented some questions of compatibility with United States law, he, the 
Department of Justice, and the Department of State saw no serious obstacles 
to ratification.
6
 Unfortunately, despite those sanguine notes, no action was 
taken on the Convention until 1988, when it was ―under review‖ during the 
Reagan and Bush administrations.
7
 During 1988, the Subcommittee on 
 
 
 5. ―Legal borders, like physical ones, are permeable, and seepage is everywhere.‖ Judith 
Resnik, Law as Affiliation: “Foreign” Law, Democratic Federalism, and the Sovereigntism of the 
Nation-State, 6 INT‘L J. CONST. L. 33, 57 (2008). 
 6. President‘s Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2715 (Nov. 12, 1980). See generally Julia 
Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299 (1995).  
 7. Ernst, supra note 6, at 310. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations held a hearing on issues related to CEDAW.
8
 
After the transition to the first Clinton administration, sixty-eight Senators 
sent a letter to the President in 1993, recommending ratification of the 
Convention.
9
 Despite that, and despite the approval of ratification by the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the placement of the matter on 
the agenda for a full vote,
10
 that Congressional session ended with no action 
taken. However, during that session, Senators Helms, Kassebaum, Brown, 
Coverdell, and Gregg filed a minority report, inveighing against the 
Convention as ―yet another set of unenforceable international standards that 
would further dilute—not strengthen—international human rights standards 
for women around the world.‖11  
CEDAW was revisited by the Foreign Relations Committee in 2002, and 
on July 30 of that year by a vote of twelve to seven, that committee again 
ordered it reported.
12
 This time, though, the opposition was better mobilized 
and farther reaching, and its targets were more diverse. For example, two 
days after committee approval, the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal 
implored the country to ―let Cedaw die.‖13 Insisting that CEDAW would do 
nothing positive, the editorial proclaimed that it would ―force upon America 
a militant feminist vision that the country long ago rejected.‖14 The target 
was not only the abstract text of CEDAW itself, but also the foreign sources 
of the treaty and the foreigners who implemented it. Invoking horror notions, 
the editorial recounted stories of gender-based abuse from such countries as 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
15
 
But the editorial also trumpeted, now ironically, the success story of 
Afghanistan as a ―brilliant example of a revolution in women‘s rights.‖16 
Obviously targeting the CEDAW Committee,
17
 it attributed that success to 
 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. Under the Constitution, sixty-seven votes are required for consent to ratify a treaty. U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 10. 140 CONG. REC. S13,927–28 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1994). 
 11. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 107–9, at 15 (2002). 
 12. Id. at 4. 
 13. Kimberly A. Strassel, Editorial, Let Cedaw Die: The Battle of the Sexes Doesn‟t Need a 
Treaty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, http://opinionjournal.com/columnists/kstrassel/?id=110002066. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. Cf. On the Ground, Three Cheers for Afghan Women, http://www.kristof.blogs.nytimes. 
com/2009/04/15/three-cheers-for-afghan-women/ (Apr. 15, 2009, 13:53) (deploring a new Afghan law 
that ―obliges women to sleep with their husbands on demand and bars them from leaving the home 
without their husbands‘ permission‖). 
 17. Article 17 of the Convention created a committee of twenty-three experts in the field of the 
Convention, to be elected by States Parties. CEDAW art. 17(1), 1249 U.N.T.S. 21. Under article 21, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/2
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the fact that the ―U.S. went in and blew up the misogynist mullahs running 
the place,‖ rather than resorting to a ―20,000 page CEDAW report‖ on giving 
Afghan women access to better burkhas.
18
 
The editorial is an easy target and would not be too troubling were that 
shrillness confined to such sources. But it is not. During the Senate 
committee‘s 2002 consideration of CEDAW, it received comments from the 
Secretary of State, the Department of Justice, and dissenting members of the 
committee, all strikingly similar to the Journal‘s comments. For example, 
Colin Powell, though supporting ―CEDAW‘s general goals‖ felt it 
nevertheless raised ―troubling questions.‖19 Specifically, the administration 
was concerned with the CEDAW Committee reports on Belarus, China, and 
Croatia.
20
 Thus, again, CEDAW was consigned to a lower priority than other 
treaties, as the review process continued.
21
 
The Department of Justice was somewhat more explicit. Again, 
emphasizing the need to act without ―undue haste,‖22 it warned that the 
CEDAW Committee ―has exploited CEDAW‘s vague text to advance 
positions contrary to American law and sensibilities.‖23 Again, it asked the 
Senate committee to vote against sending the Convention to the full Senate 
prior to a complete review by the Department of Justice.
24
 No vote took place 
within the full Senate, and the comments of the minority members of the 
Senate committee are instructive, sounding themes now familiar in this 
context. 
First, Senators Helms, Brownback, and Enzi claimed that CEDAW would 
pave the way for private actions to be used to achieve malign public policies. 
For example, they cited a failed effort to achieve enlarged abortion rights as 
the kind of effort that CEDAW would support, with the goal of ―enshrining 
unrestricted access to abortion in the United States.‖25 Second, they said that 
CEDAW conflicted with deeply ingrained notions of self-government, thus 
                                                                                                                         
 
committee members shall also make suggestions and general recommendations based on reports and 
information received from the States Parties. Id. art. 21, 1249 U.N.T.S. 22. 
 18. Strassel, supra note 13. 
 19. S. Exec. Rep. No. 107–9, at 17 (Letter from Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, to Sen. 
Joseph R. Biden Jr. (July 8, 2002)). 
 20. Those reports all legitimately focused on the political resistance to full equality for women in 
those countries. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 18 (Letter from Daniel J. Bryant on behalf of the Department of Justice, Office of 
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (July 26, 2002)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 20–24 (additional views of Sens. Helms, Brownback, and Enzi). 
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―exalting international law over constitutionally-based domestic law and 
local self-government.‖26 
Finally, the Senators attacked the CEDAW Committee itself, strenuously 
rejecting the ―meddling in all of these areas‖ by that committee.27 Moreover, 
they railed against both the committee members and the fact that they were 
―sent by dictatorships which oppress women.‖28 That point was more fully 
developed by Senator Allen, who embellished on this ad hominem attack 
directed at the States Parties themselves. He recited the failures of various 
signatories, such as Afghanistan, China, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia,
29
 but did 
not mention that CEDAW had been ratified by 185 States Parties.
30
  
Again, this smacks of political posturing aimed at pleasing either real or 
perceived constituencies, but several critical facts remain. First, CEDAW has 
not been ratified by the United States, as is the case with other human rights 
treaties. Second, the sentiments expressed by these sources appear much 
more broadly in the American narrative in this area, as they have for perhaps 
centuries.
31
 Finally, very distinct themes are present in that narrative, making 
CEDAW a likely candidate for such resistance. 
Perhaps known to few CEDAW proponents, this debate is waged on a 
Manichean battleground. Focusing on China, Belarus, and Croatia, Colin 
Powell sounded notes heard frequently. He chafed at the CEDAW 
Committee Report
32
 recommending that China decriminalize prostitution. 
However, he did not note that the recommendation was linked to health 
concerns and concerns about violence against women and problems of the 
trafficking and exploitation of prostitution.
33
 
The report on Belarus commented on that country‘s reintroduction of 
symbols (such as Mother‘s Day) that reinforced sex-role stereotypes.34 
 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 27 (additional views of Sen. Allen). 
 30. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 1, at 284.  
 31. For example, Patrick Fagan, who has been cited extensively as an authoritative source on 
CEDAW, said that the U.N., through CEDAW, is ―[i]nvolved in a campaign to undermine the 
foundations of society . . . and the legal and social structures that protect these institutions.‖ Patrick F. 
Fagan, How U.N. Conventions on Women‟s and Children‟s Rights Undermine Family, Religion, and 
Sovereignty (The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1407, 2001), available at http://www. 
heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/BG1407.cfm. 
 32. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Twentieth Session, ¶¶ 285–291, U.N. Doc. 
A/54/38 (Part I) (May 4, 1999).  
 33. S. Exec. Rep. No. 107–9, at 16–17. Mr. Bryant‘s comments took that one step further. He 
characterized the report as calling for ―legalized prostitution.‖ Id. at 18. 
 34. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Twenty-second Session, ¶ 361, U.N. Doc. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/2
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Again, the surrounding materials in that report concerned employment issues 
in Belarus and the difficulties faced by that country. Accordingly, the 
CEDAW Committee was troubled that the reintroduction of sex-role 
stereotypes could particularly hinder job opportunities for women in an 
already difficult economic setting, thus placing women at a particular 
disadvantage. 
Finally, Mr. Powell took issue with the report on Croatia.
35
 That report 
dealt with reproductive rights and stated that ―the Committee is particularly 
concerned that services pertaining to women‘s reproductive health are the 
first to be affected as a result of the Government‘s financial constraints.‖36 It 
went on to state concern about funding cuts for contraceptives and the refusal 
of some doctors, particularly at public hospitals, to perform abortions, based 
on conscientious objections.
37
 While the Committee did not require Croatia 
to recognize a right of choice, as it already had, it did ask it to provide the 
same services on the same terms for reproductive health interests as for 
others.
38
 
The abortion issue, unsurprisingly, has drawn particularly strong 
comments from CEDAW opponents. The Committee has been accused by 
some of pressuring State Parties into legalizing abortion.
39
 Indeed, the note is 
frequently sounded that CEDAW has usurped rights to cultural and religious 
self-determination.
40
 Yet, though these concerns may seem misplaced or 
simply silly, they should not be treated as prattle or otherwise marginalized. 
                                                                                                                         
 
A/55/38 (Part I) (May 1, 2000).  
 35. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Eighteenth Session, ¶¶ 109, 117, U.N. Doc. 
A/53/38 (Part I) (May 14, 1998). 
 36. Id. ¶ 109. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. ¶¶ 109, 117.  
 39. A report prepared by Thomas W. Jacobson argued that the CEDAW Committee pressured 
seventy-six party nations to legalize abortion between 1995 and 2009. THOMAS W. JACOBSON, FOCUS 
ON THE FAMILY, CEDAW COMMITTEE RULINGS PRESSURING 76 PARTY NATIONS TO LEGALIZE 
ABORTION 1995–2009 (2009), available at http://www.nrlc.org/federal/foreignaid/CEDAWDecrees 
OnAbortionJacobsonApril2009.pdf. CEDAW has no such power, and all of the instances discussed are 
much like that from the CEDAW Committee‘s discussion of Belarus, where it expressed concerns 
about equality of treatment in health care and economic areas. 
 40. A 2002 statement from Women for Faith & Family treats these choices as matters of 
―cultural self-determination of nations.‖ WFF Statement on CEDAW, http://www.wf-f.org/CEDAW. 
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). Indeed, the statement echoed an ancient debate in chastising the 
CEDAW Committee to interpret the Convention ―adequately and acceptably . . . minimizing 
‗penumbra‘ interpretations.‖ Id. The reference to Griswold is clear. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 483 (1965). Setting aside the fact that the CEDAW Committee cannot coerce members to follow 
any recommendations, these criticisms treat gender identity as a matter somehow dictated by some 
static culture, religion, or government policy, and thus being beyond the reach of the Committee. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Opponents of CEDAW see it and its work as the symbolic representation 
of much that is wrong with the world. Embracing notions of moral purity, 
they reject something that recommends decriminalizing prostitution, 
removing impediments to abortion and eliminating national imagery that 
identifies women with hearth and home.
41
 Seemingly ignoring legitimate 
contemporary problems, they yearn for a time and place without these 
illustrations of moral failure, perhaps believing that the United States either is 
there now, or will get there if the country simply resists such international 
meddling. In sum, they see CEDAW as unnecessary and see no reason for 
the United States to participate in a dialogue about other countries‘ problems. 
In all this, CEDAW‘s opponents are wrong. 
III. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTISM 
Rising to oppose Harold Koh‘s confirmation as the legal advisor to the 
Department of State, Senator John Cornyn assumed a role now familiar in 
American legal history. Koh, a major proponent of transnational normative 
thinking, would seem to be a perfect foil to Cornyn, and he was. Cornyn 
warned against his confirmation, for ―many of his writings, his speeches, and 
other statements are in tension with some very core democratic values in this 
country.‖42 According to Cornyn‘s view, the United States faced an 
ideological choice: either pledge unconditional allegiance to the U.S. 
Constitution, or be led dangerously by ―some unsigned, unratified 
international treaty or an expansive notion of international common law 
which Professor Koh embraces and advocates.‖43 These comments and 
others are laden with a sense of moral superiority, one that resists the 
integration of foreign norms within our system. 
Indeed, five years earlier, Senator Cornyn proposed the Constitution 
Restoration Act of 2004.
44
 That bill would have prohibited any court in the 
 
 
 41. In perhaps the most profound, but not atypical distortion of CEDAW, Chuck Colson, former 
counsel to President Richard Nixon, proclaimed it a sponsor of sex trafficking and prostitution: 
―CEDAW is a hindrance to ending sexual slavery. This UN treaty demands that signatory nations 
recognize prostitution as a career choice for women, and this invites sex trafficking on a massive 
scale.‖ BreakPoint Commentaries: A Job No Woman Would Choose: Hilary and Her “Sex Workers” 
(BreakPoint radio broadcast Dec. 13, 2002) (emphasis added) (transcript available at http://www. 
breakpoint.org/commentaries/2974-a-job-no-woman-would-choose). Article 6 of CEDAW states: 
―States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic 
in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.‖ CEDAW art. 6, 1249 U.N.T.S. 17. 
 42. 155 CONG. REC. S6,918 (daily ed. June 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Cornyn). Senator 
Cornyn concluded, ―We don‘t need another voice in the administration whose first instinct is to blame 
America.‖ Id. at S6,919.  
 43. Id. at S6,918. 
 44. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, S. 2082, 108th Cong. (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/2
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United States from interpreting the U.S. Constitution by reference to ―any 
constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive order, directive, policy, 
judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign state or international 
organization or agency, other than English constitutional and common 
law.‖45 But this is not a criticism of Senator Cornyn, for his views are simply 
a modern manifestation of the view that the laws of the United States are 
somehow not only better than those elsewhere, but that the United States is 
exempt from the laws that govern others in the international community. 
Holders of this view conclude that Americans need not subject themselves to 
the ―international scrutiny‖ to which other nations are exposed.46 
That sentiment has been expressed throughout American history, virtually 
from the inception of the republic,
47
 and pointedly repudiates the work of the 
United Nations. Driven perhaps by multiple agendas,
48
 opponents of the 
United Nations warn against the United States joining treaties and the 
resultant displacement, they claim, of domestic law. As Senator Everett 
Dirksen said, ―We are in a new era of international organizations. They are 
grinding out treaties like so many eager beavers which will have effect on the 
rights of American citizens.‖49 Thus, championing such sentiments, the 
American Bar Association and Senator John Bricker of Ohio sought to 
correct matters by amending the U.S. Constitution. 
During the early 1950s, Senator Bricker attempted to amend the U.S. 
Constitution to limit treaty-making authority. It is a familiar aphorism in 
America that treaties are the supreme law of the land. That derives from the 
U.S. Constitution, and it was there that Bricker sought to amend it.
50
 The 
proposed amendment went through several drafts, but in final form it stated 
that ―no treaty or executive agreement shall be made respecting the rights of 
citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution or abridging or 
 
 
 45. S. 2082, § 201. 
 46. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 154.  
 47. Professor Resnik has taken a keen interest in this topic, noting that as early as 1799, the state 
of New Jersey divorced itself from the laws of Britain in the Act of June 13, 1799, § 5, 1799 N.J. Laws 
608. That law established freedom from Britain by prohibiting any use of British law in American 
courts after July 4, 1776. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 37–38. 
 48. For example, supporters of these efforts warned against changes potentially caused to 
domestic law by internationalism in the ―so called field of civil rights.‖ Hearings Before a Subcomm. 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 1 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements and S.J. Res. 43 Proposing 
an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Relating to the Legal Effect of Certain 
Treaties, 83d Cong. 145 (1953) [hereinafter Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 & S.J. Res. 43] (Statement of 
Frank E. Holman, former President, American Bar Association). 
 49. The Bricker Amendment: A Cure Worse Than the Disease?, TIME, July 13, 1953, at 20.  
 50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (specifying that the Constitution, federal law and treaties ―shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land‖).  
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prohibiting the free exercise thereof.‖51 This provision was clearly intended 
to staunch a perceived tide of internationalism by limiting the impact of 
treaties on domestic law. It failed by a single vote, but the legal and political 
costs were considerable.
52
 
The Eisenhower administration was, at best, ambivalent about 
internationalism. While technically resisting the amendment, its sympathies 
were with Bricker. Indeed, during the Senate hearing, Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles indicated his opposition to ratifying the Genocide Convention, 
as well as his antipathy toward entering into future treaties.
53
 This reflected 
the strain of thought captured by his statement that the United States should 
not use the treaty-making power ―to effect internal social changes.‖54 The 
fear was that a liberal agenda would be furthered by those international 
influences and the United Nations itself.
55
 By this view, internationalism was 
in direct opposition to American sovereignty, and thus a threat to it.  
A. American Sovereigntism 
Sovereigntism draws from two fundamental notions within political 
thought: all sovereign nations (1) exercise control over their geographic 
territories, and (2) engage in some form of ongoing self-definition. Viewed in 
this light, many social, cultural, and political institutions participate in that 
dialogue, and the more pluralistic the society, the more complex the process 
of self-definition. Indispensable to that process is lawmaking, a process that 
orders the myriad relationships within civil society. 
Lawmaking by organizations such as the United Nations facially 
challenges this notion of national sovereignty in that international treaties are 
the product of collective efforts among member States, not the judgment of 
individual ones. Certainly, member States accede to this form of lawmaking 
by joining the United Nations and by signing and ratifying treaties,
56
 but it is 
 
 
 51. S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. (1952). 
 52. The administration‘s tepid opposition to the amendment signaled what became a persistent 
American resistance to human rights treaties and, as one commentator noted, ―marked a regression in 
the nation‘s initial course of constructive engagement in the drafting process—a clear example of a 
national authority captive to the constraints of the federal system.‖ Koren L. Bell, From Laggard to 
Leader: Canadian Lessons on a Role for U.S. States in Making and Implementing Human Rights 
Treaties, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 255, 274 (2002). Many have agreed with this assessment. 
See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 3, at 1608–09. 
 53. Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 & S.J. Res. 43, supra note 48, at 886. 
 54. Id. at 824–25. 
 55. Bricker warned against entering that internationalist path, which would only lead to ―more 
liberal social and economic policies and legislation in the United States.‖ See Resnik, supra note 3, at 
1607. 
 56. Member State compliance is subject, of course, to whatever RUDs are entered into. 
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nevertheless remarkable that these treaties apply then to members who have 
enormous diversity in laws, cultures, and social institutions. This challenge to 
wise treaty-making is intensified by the presence of federalist systems, with 
different subject areas falling within either national or local forms of 
jurisdiction.  
In the United States, the division between state and federal jurisdiction 
was once thought to be clear. Thus, for example, the general area of family 
law was long considered to fall within the exclusive province of state law.
57
 
In many respects this is still true, as some matters, such as divorce, fall solely 
within state law. Elsewhere, however, this distinction has eroded, as 
conditions have dictated the need for federal intervention in areas such as 
child custody jurisdiction and the enforcement of support across state lines. 
Yet the sense still remains in many quarters that somehow states‘ rights are 
encroached upon by federal laws—worse yet, by international treaties. 
Thus, as I have said here previously, CEDAW and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child would seem to be veritable lightning rods for the 
assertion of a passionate form of sovereigntism, as they both deal with the 
legal structures of family relationships. But it is unclear how the content of 
CEDAW, if ratified, would offend American sovereignty. 
Designed to eliminate discrimination against women in all its guises, the 
key element of CEDAW lies in its definition of ―discrimination against 
women.‖ It provides: 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‗discrimination 
against women‘ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing 
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.
58
 
Moreover, the Convention has no enforcement mechanisms, and many 
provisions are prefaced by the hortatory phrase that ―States shall take all 
appropriate measures‖ to accomplish certain Convention goals.59  
The drafting history indicates that Working Group members hotly 
debated many parts of the definition, and it went through multiple drafts.
60
 
 
 
 57. ―A region of the law which was formerly left exclusively to the states is now subject to 
federal regulation in many ways.‖ HOMER H. CLARK JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, at xvii (2d ed. 1988). 
 58. CEDAW art. 1, 1249 U.N.T.S. 16. 
 59. See, e.g., id. arts. 5–8, 1249 U.N.T.S. 17. 
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For example, the group considered whether to bar ―preferences,‖ but 
concluded not to. Similarly, by prohibiting discriminatory conduct that has 
either the effect or purpose of limiting women‘s rights, the group avoided 
problems that have plagued domestic courts dealing with legislation similarly 
striking out against discrimination. In sum, this critical term of the 
Convention is well crafted and, one would think, unthreatening.
61
 But, if the 
United States were to ratify the treaty, it would then become part of domestic 
law. Though CEDAW is likely compliant with these laws, its origins lie in 
the nebulous international community, as do its enforcers. 
Thus, the threats of CEDAW to the American psyche would seem to be 
three. First, its legal impact would seem, to some, to be of uncertain reach 
substantively, thus potentially effecting major changes in our law. Though 
this perception seems irrational and is probably false, it appears deeply felt. 
Second, CEDAW is a product of the United Nations and emanates from what 
is, to some, an offensive source. Finally, especially as has been decried 
shrilly in certain blogs, CEDAW is applied by those outside the United 
States. Outsiders would be telling Americans what to do, even though 
powerless to compel action. This would not further self-definition, but, as the 
thinking goes, thwart it. 
1. The “Sovereignty” Shibboleth 
Notions of sovereignty are frequently invoked in these dialogues, but used 
in maddeningly different ways. Indeed, it is often hard to assimilate these 
uses within any acceptable definitions of the word. Perhaps that is so because 
it has become loaded with many ideas it will not bear. 
Catherine Powell has also noted this distorted usage.
62
 Noting the 
differences in CEDAW discussions between Western and non-Western 
States, she detected an unusual assignment given to the role of culture by 
both. To her view and mine, Western States often ―invoke ‗sovereignty‘ as a 
shield against international criticism of cultural and religious practices.‖63 
                                                                                                                         
 
 60. See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 45–49 
(1993). Indeed, the representative from the United States played an active role in those deliberations. 
Id. 
 61. For a good review of the various provisions of CEDAW, see Ernst, supra note 6, at 302–08. 
However, what follows article 1 simply extends its prohibition against discrimination in various fields, 
such as sexual trafficking (article 6), the right to vote (article 7), employment (article 11), as well as 
others. See, e.g., CEDAW arts. 6, 7, 11, 1249 U.N.T.S. 17–18. 
 62. Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and Women‟s 
Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 342–43. 
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Thus, the non-West is criticized for non-compliance with CEDAW because 
of cultural barriers, whereas the West invokes sovereignty in its resistance, 
especially in the United States.
64
 Thus, whereas non-Western non-
compliance is somehow the kind of cultural primitivism of which the ―other‖ 
partakes, Western non-compliance is somehow rational when cloaked in the 
mask of sovereigntism. 
This conclusion would seem hard to prove, save for one fundamental fact: 
almost all discussions of the United Nations generally, or CEDAW 
specifically, yoke these notions together exactly as stated above. For 
example, Bob Barr, lamenting the rise of internationalism, spoke of how it 
trenches on our indispensable notions of ―national sovereignty.‖65 For him, 
our ―constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms‖ are imperiled by these 
threats to this ―precious sovereignty—the very sovereignty that so many have 
shed blood protecting.‖66 Used in that manner, the notion of sovereignty 
scarcely bears any resemblance to any familiar usage. 
But the chorus of CEDAW critics frequently conflates the cultural with 
the structural in precisely that manner. The statements from the dissenting 
Senators and others surely reflect this, as do the statements of many others of 
like sentiment. One of the few student publications opposing CEDAW cited 
the familiar, often-cited critics, in arguing that it threatens ―the fundamental 
role of the family, the freedom of religion, and the sovereignty of the U.S. 
governmental structures.‖67 Yet if sovereignty speaks to the process of self-
definition of which I have written, the very notion itself would seem to 
permit the acceptance of norms from any source, be those sources from 
within or outside the United States. Thus, the invocation of sovereignty 
would seem to be a coded signal to oppose international norms solely 
 
 
 64. For example, Syria, along with many other nations, objected to CEDAW because of its 
incompatibility with ―provisions of the Islamic sharia.‖ Indeed, further setting itself apart from the 
West, it also stated that accession to the Convention did ―in no way signify recognition of Israel or 
entail entry into any dealings with Israel.‖ Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Fourteenth Meeting, Declarations, 
Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservation Relating to [CEDAW], at 28, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (June 28, 2006). Indeed, the religious reservations made by the United 
Arab Emirates were so extensive that sixteen States Parties filed objections to those reservations, 
questioning the commitment of the UAE to the basic objectives and purposes of the Convention. See 
id. at 30–31, 55. 
 65. Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International Meddling: An 
Increasingly Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299, 323–24 (2002). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Rebecca L. Hillock, Comment, Establishing the Rights of Women Globally: Has the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women Made a 
Difference?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 481, 499 (2005). 
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because of their source, though ironically, the absorption of those norms 
would appear to be the very exercise of that sovereignty. 
Sovereigntism as self-rule, then, is completely consistent with the 
ratification of a treaty such as CEDAW. The choice to ratify is exactly the 
kind of choice that sovereign nations make. In enacting its recent 
constitution, South Africa considered how its courts should deal with laws of 
foreign origin. It decided that such bodies ―must‖ consider international law 
and ―may‖ consider foreign law.68 Similarly, the U.S. Constitution has 
elevated treaty law to the status of supreme law of the land, as previously 
mentioned. In both cases, constitutions have simply provided for 
incorporating those external laws, thus internalizing them at a level of 
national governance. And, thus far, discussion has been confined to whether 
sovereigntism is somehow a bar to the incorporation of international norms 
by national governments. 
The incorporation process would seem unexceptional. But if the driving 
force behind sovereigntism is antipathy toward the international, perhaps the 
real sovereigntism being ostensibly defended is somehow one deeply 
content-based, as I have submitted. That is, perhaps advocates would 
candidly answer, if pushed, that it is not the process that is repugnant, but the 
resultant displacement of American legal notions produced at the national 
level. Perhaps in this ideological conflict, we are dealing with ever-
decreasing circles of what is considered American.
69
 
Alex Aleinikoff has then, seeking to localize sovereignty, considered it as 
―congressional sovereignty.‖70 Since we frequently think of Congress as 
speaking for the United States, perhaps the adoption of international norms 
violates our sovereignty were those norms to collide with and displace 
domestic ones. Unfortunately for sovereigntists, that argument ignores too 
much. As Aleinikoff points out, the finding that a federal statute violates the 
Constitution is no breach of sovereignty, as the Constitution permits that 
potential result. Similarly, it permits the result that treaty law similarly 
trumps federal statutory law. As he says, the notion of congressional 
sovereignty ―simply does not make sense in the American legal and political 
systems.‖71 Similar to my incorporation argument, this is a structural 
argument addressing the conflict that arises when some form of international 
 
 
 68. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, s. 39. 
 69. Naturally, this is exactly what Catherine Powell and I refer to when we deal with the way the 
debate is pitched as an appeal to sovereigntism, rather than to the ―other‘s‖ culturalism. Be that as it 
may, the question is still one of whether the term, so used, has any conceptual coherence. 
 70. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Thinking Outside the Sovereignty Box: Transnational Law and the 
U.S. Constitution, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1989 (2004). 
 71. Id. at 1995. 
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law conflicts with that created by Congress. Our scheme of government 
dictates the result. Though some might prefer the domestic product, 
sentiment cannot dictate a legal dispute. 
But is this too technical a response to sovereigntists? Might they not reply 
that scrupulously adhering to these requirements for supremacy may yield a 
law whose content cuts against American norms, a law that though 
technically inevitable, produces a hodgepodge inconsistent with who 
Americans are as a people, making the result somehow less ―American‖? 
Perhaps, but we are no longer talking sovereigntism, then, but some 
combination of content and structure that defies neat categorization, what 
may be called culturalism.
72
  
Perhaps unwittingly then, CEDAW opponents ultimately invoke notions 
of ―popular sovereignty‖ to support their opposition. Much of this detailed 
opposition ultimately invokes notions of family values and roles thought to 
be intimately woven into the fabric of American values. Patrick Fagan, 
writing for the Heritage Foundation, has given clearest expression to these 
notions.
73
 Attacking what he calls the ―U.N.‘s Countercultural Agenda,‖ he 
argues that both CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
undermine the fundamental role of the family in an enormous number of 
ways.
74
 In all this, he argues that American values promoted and protected at 
the state level are undermined. In what I have called this ever-decreasing 
circle of what counts as American, he invokes a familiar notion that 
permeates the CEDAW debate: the voice of the people—a voice heard at the 
state level—should not be subordinated to either federally created norms or, 
worse, international norms ushered in through treaty ratification.
75
 
But this notion of sovereignty creates a raft of insoluble problems. First, 
the invocation of ―popular sovereignty‖ begs the question of ―popular with 
whom?‖ Frequently, people proclaim things ―popular‖ that simply represent 
things in which they believe. Second, even if the notion has validity, how is 
its content determined? Law creation by sovereign governmental structures is 
determinate, whereas this is not. Third, the concept of sovereignty assumes 
 
 
 72. Professor Powell would, hopefully, agree with this rubric, for short shrift is given to 
structural issues by CEDAW opponents, and a great deal of space is used in discussing the content of 
these perceived American norms. 
 73. Fagan, supra note 31. 
 74. Id. at 4–5. Fagan claims that these treaties change sexual norms, promote prostitution, 
redefine gender, attack religious freedoms, and undermine the rights and responsibilities existing 
between children and parents within the family structure. Id. at 17. 
 75. The criticism that CEDAW offends American federalism has been around since the 
beginnings of the debate. See generally Ernst, supra note 6, at 319–21; Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 
1, at 182–85. 
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some mechanism through which it is exercised, whereas here we are talking 
about volksgeist at best. 
Thus, the notion of popular sovereignty fails an essential sovereignty test. 
Self-definition in the legal sphere involves self-rule. We define ourselves in 
part through the law we create. However, inherent to this process is the view 
that some individual or institution has the ―final say‖ on what the law is. But, 
as T. Alexander Aleinikoff has asked, ―[i]n what sense do the people 
constitute the ‗final say‘ in the U.S. constitutional scheme?‖76 Since, as I 
said, sovereignty can only be invoked through the use of cognizable legal 
mechanisms, and since the so-called voice of the people has no such 
mechanism, no final say is possible because there is no way in which it can 
take place. Citizens of a nation express themselves through their elected 
representatives, and if those voices do not reflect them properly, the recourse 
is to vote them out of office. 
The call to sovereignty is, then, misplaced. No plausible theory of 
sovereignty supports CEDAW opponents, whose opposition ultimately 
degenerates into a kind of American chauvinism, ironically vaulting the state 
and local over the federal. However, since CEDAW is a human rights 
convention, its scope is expressly federal, calling for federal leadership as do 
other matters, such as civil rights and voting rights.  
American Exceptionalism and sovereigntism are, then, linked. American 
Exceptionalists envision the United States as different from the rest of the 
world, and thus not required to join in international enterprises. 
Sovereigntism is the substantive position they advance in furtherance of 
those views, claiming a betrayal of much that is distinctly and enviably 
American, were the United States to capitulate to international norms and 
instruments.  
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP TO THE PRESENT 
Being right about these matters provides little solace to CEDAW 
proponents if it cannot further national acceptance of their aspirations. Many 
commentators have a variety of responses to this gridlock, but all sound in 
some form of re-education of the American people to shuffle off the shackles 
of Exceptionalism and begin a more cosmopolitan venture into 
internationalism. 
Cass Sunstein uses the metaphor of ―norms cascades‖ to describe the 
situation in which societies experience rapid shifts to new ways of thinking, 
 
 
 76. Aleinikoff, supra note 70, at 1995. 
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thus making the acceptance of new norms easier. Indeed, it is not simply 
easier, but as Sunstein notes, ―the lowered cost of expressing new norms 
encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject previously popular 
norms.‖77 With this lowered political cost for adherence to new norms, more 
political leaders and citizens may be expected to engage in a new narrative, 
one in which internationalism has become acceptable. 
As many of these commentators have observed, the issue is one of 
creating the political will to effect change whereby opposition will recede as 
that opposition increasingly yields social disapproval. Jessica Neuwirth drew 
an interesting contrast between the effect of CEDAW and that of the Beijing 
Platform for Action.
78
 That platform grew out of the 1995 United Nations 
Fourth World Conference on Women. By all accounts, an incredibly well-
attended and successful conference, it yielded a platform expressing the 
objective of ensuring ―equality and non-discrimination under the law and in 
practice.‖79 Unsurprisingly, Neuwirth concluded that ―[t]he greater impact of 
the Beijing Platform for Action at the national level is integrally linked to the 
visibility of the Beijing process, which has in fact helped to illuminate the 
CEDAW process.‖80 
Especially in the post-September 11 United States, CEDAW is not only 
not salient, but also may seem vaguely threatening. Since American 
leadership has not championed the international until very recently, it is 
hardly surprising the CEDAW interest has not taken on a life of its own—it 
is simply impractical to expect more. However, during the waning days of 
President Bill Clinton‘s second administration, he signed an executive order 
on U.S. policy and the implementation of human rights treaties
81
 that, sadly, 
drew the most attention in vitriolic commentary on blogs. But that order 
provides one mechanism for bridging the gap from where we are nationally, 
to where we should be. 
The executive order made a number of moves designed to rationalize and 
coordinate our national oversight of human rights treaties. First, it created 
responsibility in all relevant executive departments and agencies to ―maintain 
a current awareness of United States international human rights obligations 
 
 
 77. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1997). 
 78. Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality Before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex 
Discriminatory Laws under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and through the Beijing Platform for Action, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 19 (2005). 
 79. The Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, ¶ 231, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (Jan. 1, 1996).  
 80. Neuwirth, supra note 78, at 46. 
 81. Exec. Order No. 13,107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991 (Dec. 10, 1998). 
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that are relevant to their functions.‖82 That is terribly important, as these 
matters have seemingly floated in and out of national consciousness with 
neither rhyme nor reason. Adding to that, President Clinton reposed 
responsibility in the heads of those agencies to oversee coordination with 
other bodies and to take action in processing complaints and inquiries about 
human rights violations.
83
 
Perhaps most importantly, though, the order created an Interagency 
Working Group on Human Rights Treaties to provide ―guidance, oversight, 
and coordination with respect‖ to U.S. international treaty obligations.84 
Indeed, in addition to other functions, that agency was to have served an 
educational role by ―developing plans for public outreach and education 
concerning the provisions of the ICCPR, CAT, CERD, and other relevant 
treaties, and human rights-related provisions of domestic law.‖85 Surely, 
though it takes enormous effort to educate the American populace on our 
international obligations, this constituted a major step in undertaking that 
effort. It failed. 
On February 13, 2001, President George W. Bush issued a directive 
establishing a Policy Coordination Committee on Democracy, Human 
Rights, and International Operations (―PCC‖).86 That directive transferred all 
the work of President Clinton‘s interagency group to the newly formed PCC. 
Unfortunately, the PCC submitted reports sporadically, had no dedicated 
staff, and had no resources with which to monitor human rights compliance 
with other governmental bodies.
87
 Worse and perhaps reflective of a lack of 
political will to take human rights seriously, during the 2008 Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (―CERD‖) Committee 
Review, the United States engaged outside consultants to coordinate the 
writing and issuance of the required reports.
88
 Thus, the PCC squandered an 
 
 
 82. Id. § 2(a), 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991. 
 83. Id. §§ 2(b), 3, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991. 
 84. Id. § 4(a), 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991. 
 85. Id. § 4(c)(vi), 63 Fed. Reg. 68,992. 
 86. National Security Presidential Directive No. 1, Organization of the National Security Council 
System, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd1.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). 
 87. See Kaufman, supra note 3, at 160–61. 
 88. Id. at 161. CERD requires that 
each State party [undertake] to submit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations . . . a report 
on the legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which it has adopted and which give 
effect to the provisions of the Convention: (a) within one year after the entry into force of the 
Convention for the State concerned, and (b) thereafter every two years and whenever the 
Committee so requests. Article 9, paragraph 1, also provides that the Committee may request 
further information from the States parties. 
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Guidelines for the CERD-Specific Document to 
Be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. 
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opportunity to do those things necessary to elevate the role of international 
law and make it more visible. 
A. Federalism Dialogues 
Professor Judith Resnik has written extensively about mechanisms for 
effecting law‘s migration, about the diverse ways in which international 
norms can become domesticated.
89
 She notes, for example, the growing tide 
of CEDAW initiatives at the state and local level.
90
 To some degree resisting 
the focus on the ―national,‖ she argues that these internationally originated 
norms require ―local expressions, reiterated and obliged, through 
communities that come to see their own identity as at stake when deviations 
occur.‖91 In much of this she is probably correct: no single access point exists 
for the importation of norms. Rather, the greatest gains are made by utilizing 
multiple points of entry, as with the Beijing Platform. 
But if the challenge is to re-orient the United States toward accepting 
internationalism, such local iterations might be largely ineffective.
92
 By 
contrast, in creating the interagency working group, President Clinton created 
a sensible structure for national monitoring, rationalization, and oversight of 
human rights obligations. Confining that effort to the federal level, however, 
would doom it to only partial success. Neither the local initiatives nor the 
federal one provide mechanisms for adding to the national narrative on 
internationalism; both seek only substantive compliance with accepted legal 
norms. 
CEDAW opposition draws from a number of strains of thought, among 
which is states‘ rights thinking. By that view, certain matters are best left to 
the states to decide, and state sovereignty is breached by the vertical 
imposition of national standards upon the states. Envisioning a hierarchical 
system in which the federal government foists norms on the states, states‘ 
rights supporters resist CEDAW, in part, because they resist this imposition. 
Though that view may, as previously noted, be culturally coded, it still 
represents a potent anti-CEDAW force. 
                                                                                                                         
 
CERD/C/2007/1 (June 13, 2008).  
 89. See, e.g., Resnik, supra notes 3 and 5. Her scholarship led the American Bar Association to 
confer upon her the Outstanding Scholar of the Year Award in 2008. Yale Law School, Biography of 
Judith Resnik, http://www.law.yale.edu/faculty/JResnik.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010). 
 90. Resnik, supra note 5, at 54–57. 
 91. Id. at 66. 
 92. As Lesley Wexler has noted, ―while sub-federal integration may trigger a norm cascade in 
like-minded states and cities to adopt similar propositions, it seems unlikely to spur treaty ratification.‖ 
Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified and Non-Self-
Executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1, 41 (2006).  
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Beginning a fruitful dialogue on internationalism requires the 
establishment of what has sometimes been called dialectical federalism.
93
 
Whereas CEDAW opponents fear a bullying federal government‘s intrusions 
into state matters, dialectical federalists envision a give and take, interactive 
process in which neither party claims superiority over the other. That is 
essential, as such an institution like CEDAW is doomed from the onset 
absent guarantees of a process that will permit this kind of frank political 
dialogue. 
1. An Example of Failed Federalism 
I have mentioned the need for federal leadership in areas such as voting 
rights and civil rights. Examination of a domestic dispute may explain the 
manner in which such dialogues can take place. The passage of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was a legal milestone in American history. However, 
after its passage, President Johnson rightly observed to Hubert Humphrey, ―I 
want all those other things—buses, restaurants, all of that—but the right to 
vote with no ifs, ands, or buts, that‘s the key.‖94  
Surely egregious mechanisms existed that denied the franchise, such as 
literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and poll taxes. Indeed, these mechanisms 
had even been refined, whereby devices such as Louisiana‘s ―read and 
understand‖ requirement resulted in wanton denials of the voting rights of 
African-Americans.
95
 But subtler, more devious devices also existed, such as 
the use of multi-member districts. Though too complex to explain here, that 
structure had the potential to create vote dilution, and had frequently been 
used to abridge the rights of minorities. However, the difficulty of proving 
discriminatory intent resulted in persistent vote dilution in affected districts. 
That ended with the passage of amendments to section two of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 in 1982.
96
 With those amendments, plaintiffs were no 
longer required to prove discriminatory intent. Rather, the statute was now 
 
 
 93. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus 
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977). 
 94. MERLE MILLER, LYNDON: AN ORAL BIOGRAPHY 371 (1980). 
 95. United States v. Louisiana recounts a particularly loathsome instance. ―Frdum Foof Spetgh‖ 
was deemed an acceptable response to the speech requirement of the Louisiana Constitution by a white 
voter. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 384 (E.D. La. 1963). By contrast, when asked to 
interpret how rolling stock worked, a black voter‘s response that ―it means if the owner of which does 
not have residence with the State, his rolling stock shall be taxed not to exceed forty mills on the 
dollar‖ was rejected by the registrar. Id. 
 96. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973c). 
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violated by any act that resulted in a denial or abridgement of the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.
97
  
In Chisom v. Roemer, a large group of black voters from Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana sued the Governor and a variety of state officials, alleging 
unlawful vote dilution.
98
 Specifically, they asserted that because of the 
operation of that multi-member district, their votes were diluted for the 
election of judges to the state supreme court. The path of the litigation 
demonstrates a failure of governing that could have been avoided. 
The United States intervened in the suit. Supporting the plaintiffs, it 
asserted that the districting was a ―standard, practice or procedure that results 
in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color.‖99 
The Court agreed, as the result was certainly discriminatory. But the sole 
issue before the Court was whether the Act even covered the case, as 
Louisiana had prevailed below on the ground that judges did not count under 
the Act, since they were not ―representatives‖ within its meaning. That is, 
section two provided a standard for testing vote dilution, whereby the 
decisionmaker is to employ a totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether members of a group ―have less opportunity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.‖100 The right to vote guaranteed in the chief 
section was then somehow limited by the term ―representative.‖ 
The majority quite reasonably held that the term ―representatives‖ 
designates ―the winners of representative, popular elections.‖101 After all, at 
stake was the meaning of the right to vote, and participatory democracy 
shuns the notion of denying or limiting that right based on whether the 
election is for legislators or others. It shuns the notion of a veritable whites-
only ballot for some offices not of a legislative nature. But that is just the 
limit that Justice Scalia would have imposed. For him, the Court‘s job was 
not to ―scavenge the world of English usage to discover whether there is any 
possible meaning of representatives which suits our preconception that the 
statute includes judges.‖102 Rather, the term should be limited to those who 
represent the people, and under that requirement, judges simply did not 
count. 
 
 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 98. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
 99. Id. at 387 (internal quotations omitted). 
 100. Id. at 388 (citing Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (emphasis added)). 
 101. Id. at 399. 
 102. Id. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Representing a sad failure of our political and legal institutions, this suit 
could have been avoided under a different structure of lawmaking, one 
utilizing the kinds of mediating devices called for here. Were some body 
present that coordinated federal and state law, Louisiana‘s law would have 
been examined in light of the amendments to section two, enacted nine years 
previously.
103
 Presumably, that districting scheme would have been 
questioned and, hopefully, eliminated. Second, because this examination 
never occurred, a large group of people was disenfranchised and had to resort 
to legal action to regain that franchise. Moreover, that action was just one of 
potentially many that could have taken place in that state as well as others. 
Finally, that suit was a sad spectacle of litigation that dragged on to the 
Supreme Court, which obviously incurred all the costs and unfortunate 
delays in justice. But the question is, how can the CEDAW debate benefit 
from this lesson of the movement; what is to be done to create institutions 
that preclude these foolish conflicts? 
B. Institutionalized Federalism: Rewriting the Narrative 
CEDAW ratification can only be achieved if Americans first form 
structures to conduct proper dialogues on its impact throughout the country. 
Indeed, it is pointless to even hope for ratification unless these mechanisms 
for discussion among all levels of government are first constructed, for 
consensus is not politically feasible until antagonists recognize that rhetorical 
flailing has achieved nothing, neither preserving imagined American norms, 
nor successfully joining in a global narrative. 
The United States has no formal mechanisms in place for conducting this 
dialogue. However, constructing viable mechanisms must proceed from a 
different view of American Exceptionalism. As Resnik has said, 
characterizing American Exceptionalism ―in the ‗beacon of liberty mode,‘ 
argues both the awkwardness of standing apart from this great human rights 
effort and the need to participate so as to press other nations ‗for fuller 
compliance.‘‖104 Thus far, failure to invest in that narrative has 
understandably filled proponents with a terrible sense of poignancy at how 
we have distanced ourselves from something so thoroughly in line with 
American ideals as CEDAW.
105
  
 
 
 103. Naturally, that kind of examination would have taken place throughout the body of state law 
in the United States, thus averting the kinds of contests and crises that took place, as well as the woeful 
denials that undoubtedly went unnoticed and unaddressed. 
 104. Resnik, supra note 3, at 1657. 
 105. Resnik discusses the complete congruence between what we have done, what CEDAW 
stands for, and the sad irony of our resistance to the Convention. Id. at 1657–58. 
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Writing a profoundly personal piece online, psychologist Jonathan Haidt 
explored the deep divide within American political thought or, better, 
American political party thought.
106
 Reacting to the perverse phenomenon of 
Republicans and Democrats talking at utterly cross purposes, he noted that 
when ―Democrats try to explain away these positions using pop psychology 
they err, they alienate, and they earn the label ‗elitist.‘ But how can 
Democrats learn to see—let alone respect—a moral order they regard as 
narrow-minded, racist, and dumb?‖107  
Haidt addressed that, in part, through the teachings of Emile Durkheim. 
Durkheim envisioned society as more than a collection of individuals, but as 
a kind of living entity that, as summed up by Haidt, required ―tending and 
caring.‖108 The Durkheimian conception of a society that resisted what 
Durkheim saw as a pervasive anomie (normlessness), rests on principles of 
self-control, duty, and loyalty to one‘s groups.109 By Haidt‘s analysis, that 
mirrors much of the thinking of many social conservatives: they add to the 
moral mind the qualities of respect for authority and an appreciation of purity 
or sanctity.
110
 Thus, the key to bridging this communication gap lies in 
appreciating this enlarged spectrum of moral concerns and participating in 
the resulting enlarged moral dialogue. Proponents of federalist structures 
necessary to conduct proper dialogue must take the lead in changing this 
narrative.  
Naturally, it is difficult to locate just where the national narrative takes 
place. Certainly, though, our major news media and unquestionably the 
President play a major role in conducting and, if need be, restructuring this 
narrative. American Exceptionalism is strongest during periods of crisis as, 
for example, the Bricker Amendment proposed during the turbulent period 
after World War II illustrates. Other peaks similarly occurred during times of 
crisis and challenge, times during which, in Haidt‘s language, the necessity 
of ―tending and caring‖ was most acute. At precisely such times, the need is 
greatest to narrow the gap between the parties, often in the rhetoric used to 
address the American people. 
 
 
 106. Jonathan Haidt, What Makes People Vote Republican?, EDGE, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www. 
edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt08/haidt08_index.html. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Thus, Haidt quoted Durkeim, ―Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a 
rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free himself from all social pressure is to 
abandon [him to] himself and demoralize him.‖ Id. To Haidt and Durkheim, the family, not the 
individual, is the basic social unit for society, enabling people to act together to reach common goals. 
Id. 
 110. Id. 
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Presidential rhetoric is often carefully crafted to bring us together. For 
example, George W. Bush, facing wars on two fronts, frequently responded 
to challenges, saying that we would continue to ―stay the course‖ until the 
job was done.
111
 A simple expression, it nevertheless was designed to 
comfort, conveying a sense of resolve and persistence, yet moderation. 
However, during that period of usage, the United States somewhat lurched 
and drifted, and the rhetoric rang hollow with no useful content.  
During the difficult era of the Great Depression and World War II, 
President Franklin Roosevelt conducted thirty ―Fireside Chats.‖ In each, he 
tried to inform and comfort the American people on a rich variety of topics 
ranging from his first program dealing with the bank crisis in 1933 to his 
famous declaration of war with Japan on December 9, 1941.
112
 Throughout, 
he provided a voice for the country, directly addressing the people, speaking 
in a rhetoric of national pride, yet avoiding jingoism. 
At the time of this writing, the United States faces the difficult extrication 
from two armed conflicts, enormous economic challenges, and the need to 
move on by better addressing the palpable needs of the American people for 
an improved quality of life.
113
 Part of that venture involves ridding 
Americans of the closed-mindedness into which they have fallen nationally, 
and reconceptualizing American Exceptionalism as a beacon of liberty. 
C. Mediating Federalism: An Example from Canada 
Strikingly, the United States lacks both a national human rights 
compliance mechanism, as well as a way to coordinate federal and state 
agendas. Over one hundred countries worldwide have national human rights 
institutions (―NHRI‖).114 Often inspired by the Paris Principles, these 
organizations differ from state to state, but share the attributes of 
permanence, independence, and establishment by constitutional mandate, 
legislation, or executive order.
115
  
 
 
 111. See, e.g., Stewart M. Powell, Bush Alters Course on „Stay the Course‟, TIMESUNION.COM, 
Oct. 24, 2006, http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/story.asp?StoryID=528347&TextPage=1. 
 112. See generally RUSSELL D. BUHITE & DAVID W. LEVY, FDR‘S FIRESIDE CHATS (1992). 
 113. Indeed, the rhetoric of President Barack Obama was best exemplified by his slogan, ―yes, we 
can.‖ It emphasized in those three words much of the sense of the American mission to overcome and 
prevail. 
 114. Shubhankar Dam, Lessons from National Human Rights Institutions Around the World for 
State and Local Human Rights Commissions in the United States 2 (Kennedy Sch. of Gov‘t, Executive 
Session on Human Rights Comm‘ns & Criminal Justice, Executive Session Paper No. 5, 2007), 
available at http://www.hrccj.org/pdfs/nhri.pdf.  
 115. Id. at 3. The Paris Principles, though not binding as international rules, set minimum 
standards for NHRIs. Those standards consist of competence and responsibilities, composition and 
independence, methods of operations and principles relating to their status as quasi-judicial bodies. Id. 
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This gap in U.S. institutions has not gone unnoticed internationally. As a 
party to CERD, the United States has filed the required reports with its 
committee.
116
 After the filing of various periodic reports in 2008, the CERD 
Committee issued its concluding observations, concerns, and 
recommendations.
117
 A far-ranging report, dealing with matters as varied as 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and disturbing developments in the 
Supreme Court on affirmative action,
118
 it strongly recommended the 
establishment of institutions to oversee and coordinate CERD efforts. First, it 
recommended that, in accordance with the Paris Principles, the United States 
―consider the establishment of an independent national human rights 
institution.‖119 This institution would serve the functions previously 
discussed here in reference to the Interagency Working Group and the PCC. 
Second, it ―recommend[ed] that the State party establish appropriate 
mechanisms to ensure a coordinated approach towards the implementation of 
the Convention at the Federal, state, and local levels.‖120 Such a mechanism 
would address problems inherent in federalism, and naturally should not only 
exist for CERD purposes, but should also operate to assure compliance both 
with those treaties the United States has ratified and those hopefully ratified 
soon. 
Canada has done this, despite a more complex federal scheme than that of 
the United States. The Canadian federal government cannot legislate on 
matters that fall within provincial jurisdiction,
121
 though it has the exclusive 
power to ratify treaties.
122
 As a result, cooperation with territorial and 
                                                                                                                         
 
Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles), G.A. Res. 48/134, 
¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993). 
 116. See supra note 88. 
 117. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 
8, 2008). 
 118. The Committee noted that article 2, paragraph 2 of CERD requires the adoption of special 
measures ―when circumstances so warrant‖ as a tool to eliminate ―persistent disparities in the 
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms,‖ and that the Court‘s retreat on affirmative 
action was an avoidance of Convention obligations. Id. ¶ 15. 
 119. Id. ¶ 12. 
 120. Id. ¶ 13. 
 121. Under the Canadian constitution, a province has exclusive jurisdiction over ―[m]atters of a 
merely local or private Nature in the Province.‖ Constitution Act, 1867, art. 92, cl. 16, 30 & 31 Vict. 
Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C. No. 5 (Appendix 1985). Lord Atkin established that to mean that 
only the province can enact legislation affecting the local implementation of treaties and also that 
federal-provincial cooperation was, therefore, imperative for the execution of treaties. For him, ―while 
the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters she still retains the watertight 
compartments which are an essential part of her original structure.‖ Attorney-General for Can. v. 
Attorney-General for Ont., [1937] A.C. 326, 354 (P.C.) (on appeal from Can.). 
 122. Attorney-General for Can. v. Attorney-General for Ont., [1937] A.C. 326. See also 
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provincial governments is essential to the successful implementation of 
treaties. Thus, Canada and the United States are studies in contrast—whereas 
the Canadian treaty power is constrained legally, that of the United States is 
constrained politically. 
Describing this phenomenon of American federalism, Herbert Wechsler 
noted the political force exerted by the states. He saw the American system 
as ―retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the 
states . . . necessitating the widest support before intrusive measures of 
importance can receive significant consideration.‖123 The President, too, must 
heed this political reality, though he or she is the national repository of the 
spirit of federal government, as all actions must surmount the great ―local 
sensitivity of Congress‖ before anything can be achieved.124 
For both the United States and Canada, then, the institutional needs are 
similar, and in 1975, Canada established the Continuing Committee of 
Officials on Human Rights (―CCOHR‖).125 The CCOHR‘s mandate was to 
coordinate intergovernmental actions on human rights issues generally and 
with respect to the elaboration, ratification, and implementation of 
international human rights treaties.
126
 Emphasizing the need for the territories 
and provinces to willingly cooperate in those efforts, the CCOHR also 
acknowledged that its responsibility must not only be to actually participate 
in the worldwide human rights effort, but also to be seen doing so.
127
 
The 1975 agreement rested upon the notion that success required the 
greatest cooperation among the three levels of government. For dialogue to 
be successful, the agreement was founded upon five bedrock principles that 
would facilitate the fullest involvement possible. First, the three levels of 
government would consult among themselves prior to either ratification or 
denunciation by Canada of an international human rights treaty. Second, each 
provincial and territorial government had the right to prepare its own report 
on human rights activities, and all reports would be included in the Canadian 
                                                                                                                         
 
Constitution Act, 1867, art. 91, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C. No. 5 (Appendix 
1985) (delineating the areas of exclusive national legislative authority). See generally How Canada 
Works with the United Nations, http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/pdp-hrp/inter/un-eng.cfm (last visited Feb. 
15, 2010). 
 123. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Continuing Committee of Officials on Human Rights [CCOHR], http://www.pch.gc.ca/ 
pgm/pdp-hrp/canada/cmtt-eng.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010) (stating that the Federal-Provincial 
Conference of Ministers Responsible for Human Rights met and agreed on provisions forming bedrock 
for the CCOHR on December 12, 1975). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 117, ¶ 12. 
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submission. Third, the provinces and territories could have representatives as 
part of the Canadian delegation at any international meetings on the reports, 
most notably the U.N. meetings. Fourth, provinces and territories were given 
the right to defend or explain their laws or institutions, if challenged by any 
international body. Finally, provinces and territories were to be regularly 
informed by the federal government regularly of international developments 
in human rights.
128
  
This system has operated without interruption since its establishment, and 
the various U.N. committees have consistently praised it for its compliance 
with reporting requirements and thoughtful participation in the vetting 
process.
129
 Most significant, though, is the obvious byplay that has taken 
place between Canada and the committees with which it has dealt, a byplay 
requiring the successful implementation of the CCOHR agreement. Through 
this dialectical process, Canada first engaged in its nationwide dialogues, 
then presented that work product to the committees, which in turn vetted 
them and submitted their reports for consideration. After that, Canada 
reacted, either accepting those observations and adjusting appropriately, or in 
some way fashioning responses designed to satisfy its international 
obligations.
130
 
The CEDAW Committee reports, despite the criticism of domestic 
opponents, represent sober assessments on Convention compliance. Indeed, 
in the case of Canada, they are as significant in what they do not say, as what 
they do. Sexually discriminatory laws are rife worldwide, with Mali 
requiring wives to be obedient, Northern Nigeria permitting wife beating, 
Kuwaiti women denied the franchise, and Pakistani women valued at half a 
 
 
 128. CCOHR, supra note 125. 
 129. For example, the last CERD report noted that it ―appreciates the extensive and detailed 
responses provided to the questions asked during the consideration of the report and the open and 
constructive dialogues with the delegation.‖ Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Eliminations of Discrimination Against Women, Canada, ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (May 25, 2007). Similarly, the CEDAW committee commented on 
the ―large delegation‖ sent by Canada and appreciated the ―open and constructive dialogue that took 
place between the delegation and members of the Committee . . . .‖ Comm. on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Eliminations of 
Discrimination Against Women: Canada, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/7 (Nov. 7, 2008) 
[hereinafter 2008 Concluding Observations: Canada]. 
 130. Naturally, Canada is just the example used of how a federalist government can adjust to 
treaty requirements. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Confronting the “Sacred and Unchangeable”: 
The Obligation to Modify Cultural Patterns under the Women‟s Discrimination Treaty, 30 U. PA. J. 
INT‘L L. 585 (2008). Ms. Sepper points out the responses of a number of states to the CEDAW reports.  
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person in attestation to financial obligations.
131
 Canada, by contrast, has 
faltered in relatively minor ways. 
The most recent CEDAW Committee observations on Canada reflect this, 
and also reflect the manner in which Canada has adjusted after the 2003 
report.
132
 Commenting on few substantive issues, the CEDAW Committee 
observations dealt largely with issues of political will. For example, it 
reiterated its concern, expressed previously in 2003, that ―the federal 
government may lack the will and an efficient mechanism to ensure that the 
provincial and territorial governments establish legal and other measures to 
fully implement the Convention in a coherent and consistent manner.‖133 
Given the paucity of substantive issues raised, that may send an unclear 
message to Canada about just where that dialogue had failed. However, the 
fact remains that the dialogue exists, and the mechanism for communicating 
among levels of government, while perhaps imperfect, also exists. 
The United States will accept CEDAW if proponents appeal to national 
pride in providing a beacon of liberty for the world.
134
 The appeal should be 
cast in the rhetoric of taking a common stand against inequalities, wherever 
they may be found. But it is not just rhetoric; this is not a charade, but an 
appeal to the best in us. Thus, it should also be emphasized that CEDAW 
presents no threat to state sovereignty, as every state is likely compliant. 
Once it is demystified, much of the sense of threat experienced by many 
opponents will recede. 
The establishment of a mechanism similar to Canada‘s will similarly 
begin to assuage fears and limit resistance, as recasting the dialogue as one 
among equals and providing maximum participation among the states also 
limits the notion of a bullying federal government dictating to them. Again, 
though, the establishment of this kind of mechanism is a precondition to 
treaty ratification, and must therefore precede that effort. These steps are 
simple, but the political challenges to ratification are still very real, and are a 
part of our national spirit that must be reexamined.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Culture is a social construct, and not a static, inevitable force of nature 
preventing change. For some countries, that construct has resulted in the 
 
 
 131. See Neuwirth, supra note 78, at 19. 
 132. See 2008 Concluding Observations: Canada, supra note 129.  
 133. Id. ¶ 11. 
 134. As Resnik and others have pointed out, we have many local iterations of CEDAW already. 
See generally Resnik, supra note 3 and accompanying text. However, since I am talking about altering 
the national narrative, that can only take place at the national level. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss2/2
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE U.S. TO RATIFY CEDAW 223 
 
 
 
 
persecution and torture of women. Nicholas Kristof also wrote during the 
2002 period during which the Senate committee reviewed the Convention, 
but from a very different perspective than some of the others examined here. 
Resisting Jesse Helms‘ claim that it enshrined a ―radical anti-family agenda,‖ 
Kristof saw CEDAW as rather providing the barest modicum of protection 
for women in many parts of the world. Thus, he asked, ―Do we really want to 
side with the Taliban mullahs, who, like [then U.S. Attorney General] Mr. 
Ashcroft, fretted that the treaty imposes sexual equality? Or do we dare side 
with third-world girls who die because of their gender, more than 2,000 of 
them today alone?‖135 
But just as some places have cultures and ways hostile to women‘s rights, 
American Exceptionalism is also a cultural manifestation. The United States‘ 
wary resistance to internationalism prevents it from providing the leadership 
role in human rights that it can. Though a treaty ratification alone will not 
dramatically alter that national mindset, it can advance the norms cascade to 
move the United States just a little farther down the road to a more just 
society. 
 
 
 135. Nicholas D. Kristof, Editorial, Women‟s Rights: Why Not?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at 
A23. 
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